I
Long Covid, Disability, and the Price of Recognition in the Netherlands
Part One: The Architecture of Denial
There is a particular cruelty that bureaucracies have perfected over centuries — not the cruelty of malice, which at least has the honesty of intent, but the cruelty of institutional convenience dressed in the language of procedure.
In the Netherlands today, thousands of people are living inside that cruelty. They are post-Covid patients. Many are young. Some are teenagers. They cannot walk to the end of their street. They cannot stand long enough to shower without collapsing. Their hearts race at rest. Their nervous systems have been rewired by a virus that medical science is only beginning to understand. They have names for what happened to them: Long Covid. POTS. Post-viral syndrome. Dysautonomia.
Their doctors have names for it too. The WHO has a name for it. Peer-reviewed literature, accumulating now in the thousands of papers, has names for it.
The Dutch state, however, has a problem with names.
What Recognition Actually Means
To understand why, you need to understand what formal recognition of a disabling condition actually costs a welfare state.
The Netherlands runs its disability assessment system primarily through the UWV — the Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen, the Employee Insurance Agency. When a citizen claims disability, a UWV physician assesses their functional capacity — what they can and cannot do in a working context. If that capacity is sufficiently reduced, benefits flow. Income replacement. Support. The formal acknowledgment that a person’s body has been taken from them by circumstance beyond their control.
Now consider the numbers.
Conservative estimates suggest somewhere between 150,000 and 450,000 people in the Netherlands are experiencing persistent, functionally limiting post-Covid symptoms. Studies across EU member states suggest roughly 10-15% of Covid infections result in prolonged symptoms. Of those, a meaningful fraction — possibly 1 in 10, possibly more — experience symptoms severe enough to impair their ability to work, study, or maintain basic daily function.
If the Dutch state were to formally recognize Long Covid as a disabling condition within the UWV framework — triggering disability benefits, treatment obligations, potential retroactive claims, lost income compensation — the financial exposure would be enormous.
Estimates, modeled conservatively on comparable recognition events such as the eventual formal acceptance of ME/CFS or asbestos-related disease, suggest billions of euros in aggregate liability. Some analysts place it higher. None place it low.
This is not a secret. It is arithmetic. And arithmetic has consequences.
The Boy Who Cannot Stand
Consider a hypothetical, though not a fictional one.
An eighteen-year-old contracts Covid. He is healthy before. Athletic, perhaps. Certainly young enough that every instinct of medicine and common sense says he should recover fully.
He does not recover.
Within months he develops POTS — Postural Orthostatic Tachycardia Syndrome — a dysautonomic condition in which the autonomic nervous system fails to regulate heart rate and blood pressure correctly upon standing. The result: dizziness, tachycardia, near-fainting, crushing fatigue, cognitive impairment. He cannot attend school. Some days he cannot leave his room. Standing for ten minutes is a medical event.
His physicians document this meticulously. The diagnosis is not in dispute medically. The paper trail is extensive. The prognosis is, in the honest language of current medicine, uncertain — because there is no established treatment protocol in the Netherlands, no recognized rehabilitation pathway, and no clear timeline for recovery. He may improve in years. He may not.
His parent does what any responsible adult would do. They file for disability recognition with the UWV.
The Assessment
The UWV assigns a physician to assess the case.
Here is what that physician faces, structurally: a young man with a diagnosis that, if formally accepted as disabling within the UWV framework, does not simply resolve his case. It creates a precedent. In Dutch administrative law, consistent rulings build into a de facto recognition framework. One successful Long Covid disability case, upheld on appeal, upheld again, becomes a citation. Becomes a template. Becomes the basis for the next ten cases, and the hundred after that, and the ten thousand after that.
The UWV physician knows this. The institution knows this. The lawyers who work in this space know this.
And so the assessment finds, somehow, that the functional impairment is insufficient. That the evidence is ambiguous. That the condition does not meet threshold. That the young man — who cannot stand without his heart rate spiking to 150 — retains meaningful work capacity.
The family contests. They go to court.
The Court
Administrative courts in the Netherlands operate on a principle that is reasonable in theory and devastating in practice: they defer heavily to expert medical opinion. When the UWV presents its physician’s assessment, the court’s inclination is to accept it unless a counter-expert opinion of equal or greater credibility is presented.
For families navigating this system without resources — relying on pro-deo legal aid, without the budget to commission independent specialist reports — that structural asymmetry is close to insurmountable.
And there is something else.
Pro-deo lawyers operate within a system. They depend on continued access to that system. When a case is politically inconvenient — when a win would detonate across the disability claims of tens of thousands of waiting plaintiffs — the pressures on every actor in the process align in one direction.
Not through overt instruction, necessarily. Systems are more elegant than that. The pressure is ambient. Careers are long. Judgments are made about which battles to fight. A lawyer advising a client that an appeal is “without merit” is making a legal judgment, yes — but legal judgments are never made in a vacuum.
The case loses.
The young man remains unrecognized, unsupported, and sick.
The Structural Argument
Let us be precise about what is being claimed here, and what is not.
This article does not claim that a minister signed a document ordering the falsification of disability assessments. It does not require that conspiracy. It requires something far more mundane and far more structural:
That institutions under acute financial pressure consistently find reasons not to recognize what recognition would cost them.
That is not a radical thesis. It is what happened with asbestos. With Gulf War Syndrome. With repetitive strain injury. With ME/CFS, for which patients waited decades for recognition that physicians had informally accepted years earlier.
The question is not whether Dutch institutions are staffed by evil people. They are not.
The question is whether a system that cannot afford the truth will find, reliably and repeatedly, reasons to doubt it.
The answer, in the Netherlands in 2024 and 2025, appears to be yes.
Part Two will examine the specific legal mechanisms through which Long Covid claims are assessed and rejected, and what successful challenges in other EU jurisdictions have looked like.
II
The State That Cannot Afford the Truth
Part Two: Necropolitics and the Cultivation of the Abscess
The Arithmetic of Postponement
When an institution denies a legitimate claim, it does not make the cost disappear. It relocates it.
The young man who cannot stand does not cease to exist because the UWV decided his condition was insufficiently disabling. His body continues to malfunction. His life continues to contract. The costs of his illness — medical, social, economic, psychological — continue to accumulate. They are simply redirected: onto his family, onto informal care networks, onto the frayed edges of municipal social support, onto the psychological reserves of a parent who now functions simultaneously as carer, advocate, legal researcher, and emotional shock absorber.
This is the hidden accounting of denial. The state does not save money. It performs a shell game with it — moving the liability off its own balance sheet and distributing it, without consent, across the people least equipped to absorb it.
And it does something else. It defers.
The bill does not disappear. It compounds.
A twenty-year-old denied disability recognition today is a forty-year-old with two decades of untreated chronic illness, zero pension accumulation, no career history, degraded social networks, and potentially severe secondary conditions that untreated primary illness tends to produce. That person will eventually re-enter the system — through emergency healthcare, through crisis social support, through a disability claim filed when the condition has become so undeniable that even the most convenient assessment cannot dismiss it.
By then, the cost will be substantially higher.
This is not an accident. It is how systems under financial pressure behave when they cannot afford honesty in the present tense.
They practice, in the precise academic language coined for exactly this phenomenon: necropolitics.
What Necropolitics Actually Means
The term was developed by Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe, initially to describe how colonial states determined which populations were allowed to live and which were exposed to death — not always literally, but structurally. Who receives the resources of the state. Whose suffering is legible to the state’s instruments. Whose death — physical, social, economic — is permitted, managed, or quietly administered.
Mbembe was writing about extreme cases: war zones, colonial subjugation, the biopolitics of race and sovereignty. But the framework has since been applied, carefully and productively, to welfare states that manage populations by deciding whose conditions are recognized and whose are not.
Because recognition is not merely administrative. It is an act of political ontology — a declaration that this person’s suffering exists in the categories the state uses to respond to suffering. To withhold recognition is to place a person outside those categories. To render them, in the technical language, illegible.
Long Covid patients in the Netherlands are being rendered illegible.
Not shot. Not imprisoned. Not in any way that would trigger visible outrage or international condemnation. Simply placed outside the frame of official recognition — in a space where their suffering is documented, their diagnoses are medically established, their functional impairment is visible to anyone who spends an hour with them, and yet the state’s instruments look through them as though through glass.
This is necropolitics operating in a temperate, prosperous, self-congratulatorily humane democracy.
It is, in some ways, more instructive for being so mundane.
The Abscess
There is a biological metaphor that describes what happens to populations subjected to this kind of structured non-recognition, and it is not a gentle one.
An abscess forms when the body cannot clear an infection. Unable to eliminate the pathogen, unable to integrate it, the immune system walls it off — encapsulates the damage, seals it from the surrounding tissue, and maintains a condition of contained, chronic suppuration. The abscess does not heal. It does not resolve. It persists, walled off from the body’s resources, a pocket of accumulated damage that the body has decided it cannot afford to treat.
Long Covid patients, and more broadly the populations of people living with post-viral syndromes, ME/CFS, POTS, and related conditions that welfare states have refused to formally recognize — these populations are being managed as abscesses.
Contained. Isolated from the redistributive resources of the state. Walled off behind evidentiary thresholds they cannot meet because the thresholds were calibrated to ensure they cannot meet them. Left to accumulate damage in a sealed pocket of non-recognition, invisible on the official ledger, present and festering in social reality.
The state knows this, in the way that institutions know things — not as explicit policy, not as a memo signed by a secretary of state, but as an ambient institutional understanding distributed across thousands of individual actors who each make small, locally reasonable decisions that aggregate into systemic cruelty.
The Headsmen
And this is where the experience of these families becomes not just painful but philosophically clarifying.
Because the apparatus of denial is not staffed by monsters.
The UWV physician who writes the dismissive assessment is, probably, a moderately overworked medical professional operating under institutional guidelines, aware at some level that the guidelines are inadequate, but aware also that deviating from them carries professional risk and delivering the expected outcome does not. They may be personally quite sympathetic. They may use a slightly gentler tone on days they feel generous.
But what families encounter — and this is documented, repeated, consistent across accounts — is something recognizable as the behavioral signature of institutional bad faith: bitterness, condescension, passive aggression, a sarcastic edge to official communications, a barely concealed hostility that breaks through the bureaucratic register like heat through asphalt.
This is not random. It is a tell.
When an institution’s executors know, at some functional level, that what they are doing is wrong — when the gap between official position and observable reality is wide enough that the people enforcing the official position cannot entirely suppress their awareness of it — the psychological discharge often comes out sideways. Not as explicit acknowledgment of the injustice, which would be professionally catastrophic. But as contempt. As petty cruelty. As the particular hostility that people direct at those who make their own complicity visible simply by existing and persisting.
The family filing the appeal is not just a case number. They are an accusation — wordless, structural, impossible to directly answer. The system responds to that accusation the way all cornered systems do: not by capitulating, but by making the cost of persistence as high as possible.
The condescension is load-bearing. It is doing institutional work.
The Transferred Ledger
So what does this actually cost?
Not the cost to the state — the cost the state is so carefully managing through non-recognition.
The cost to society. The real, total, unshifted cost that denial merely relocates rather than eliminates.
A young person removed from the productive economy at eighteen, denied support, unsupported through the formation years of adulthood, will accumulate a lifetime of foregone earnings, foregone tax contributions, degraded health requiring increasingly expensive interventions, and family-level economic damage that ripples outward — parents who reduce work hours to provide care, siblings whose family resources are redirected, relationships that fracture under the weight of uncompensated caregiving.
Modeled across tens of thousands of people in this situation, the total social cost of denial likely exceeds the cost of recognition and treatment. It is simply distributed differently — spread thin across informal networks, diffuse enough to escape line-item visibility, paid in currencies the state’s accounting systems were not designed to measure.
Chronic unrecognized illness is expensive. It is just expensive for the wrong people.
The Question the State Will Not Answer
There is a question that sits underneath all of this, that every piece of evidence in this landscape keeps forcing back to the surface:
If recognizing Long Covid disability would cost billions, how much of the current uncertainty is genuine medical ambiguity — and how much is the institutional management of a cost the state has decided it cannot bear?
That question cannot be answered by any single case. It is answered, or not, by the pattern. By the accumulation of rejections. By the calibration of thresholds. By the behavior of the lawyers, the assessors, the courts — all of whom make locally explicable decisions that arrive, with remarkable consistency, at the same destination.
The abscess holds.
The costs compound.
The headsmen continue their work, efficiently and with a certain ambient contempt for those whose continued suffering makes their work necessary.
And somewhere, an eighteen-year-old who cannot stand up waits for a letter that will not tell him the truth.
III
Part Three: The Incremental Catastrophe
What a Functional Society Actually Is
A functional society is not defined by its GDP. Not by its infrastructure, its legal codes, its international reputation, or the smoothness of its administrative processes. These are outputs. They are symptoms of something more fundamental.
A functional society is one that has made a prior commitment — implicit, cultural, constitutional in the deepest sense — to shared reality.
It agrees, collectively, that when a problem exists, the problem exists. That when a person is suffering, the suffering is real. That when science produces a finding, the finding enters the common ledger of what we act upon. That human dignity is not contingent on convenience — not on whether recognizing it is affordable this fiscal quarter, not on whether the person whose dignity is at stake is politically useful, not on whether the cost of acknowledgment fits the current government’s budget projections.
This is not sentimentality. It is load-bearing architecture.
The entire structure of democratic welfare — insurance systems, disability frameworks, public health infrastructure, legal aid, the social contract in its operational form — rests on the foundational premise that the state will not lie about what it sees. That the collective will absorb the cost of reality rather than manufacture an alternative reality that is cheaper to administer.
When that premise is violated, nothing dramatic happens immediately.
That is precisely the danger.
The First Lie
The first lie is always the easiest.
It is also always the most defensible. There is genuine medical ambiguity about Long Covid. There are real evidentiary difficulties in assessing fluctuating functional capacity. There are legitimate questions about where disability thresholds should sit. The system can, at this stage, tell itself — and it does tell itself — that it is simply applying rigorous standards. Being careful with public funds. Awaiting stronger consensus.
This is the story institutions tell at the moment of first betrayal. And it is always at least partially true. There is always some ambiguity to gesture at. There is always some procedural justification available. The lie hides inside the legitimate uncertainty like a parasite in a host.
But the commitment has been made. The institution has now established — internally, in its practices and incentive structures and the unspoken understandings of its staff — that the correct outcome in these cases is denial. The reasoning can be adjusted later. The conclusion is fixed.
And having fixed the conclusion once, for reasons of financial exposure, the institution has learned something about itself.
It has learned that it can.
The Incremental Logic
What follows is not a dramatic lurch toward authoritarianism or explicit discrimination. It is something more mundane and therefore more dangerous: the normalization of expediency as method.
Each subsequent exclusion is easier than the last, because the infrastructure of exclusion — the assessment frameworks, the evidentiary thresholds, the culture of condescension toward claimants, the legal aid lawyers who know which way the wind blows — is already in place. It was built for Long Covid patients. It will serve perfectly well for the next category of inconvenient reality.
Who that next category is depends on variables that have nothing to do with justice or science or human dignity. It depends on:
Who is in government and what their electoral coalition requires.
What the price of energy is doing to the national budget.
Whether there has been a bad harvest, a financial crisis, a pandemic, a war.
What cultural anxieties are currently available to be activated.
Whether the targeted population has enough political voice to resist, or whether they are sufficiently marginal — sufficiently pierceable, sufficiently accented, sufficiently pigmented, sufficiently Catholic or Irish or redolent of garlic — that the cost of their exclusion can be distributed without political consequence.
The rounding error creeps. This is not metaphor. It is the documented mechanism of institutional decay across every historical case we have.
The asbestos workers came before the Gulf War veterans. The Gulf War veterans came before the ME/CFS patients. The ME/CFS patients before the Long Covid patients. At each stage the infrastructure of denial was refined, the legal frameworks were stress-tested, and the institutional muscle memory of exclusion was strengthened.
The Banality of the Headsman
Hannah Arendt, writing about a different and far more extreme instance of institutional machinery producing atrocity, identified what she called the banality of evil — the observation that history’s worst outcomes are usually administered not by fanatics but by functionaries. By people doing their jobs. By people who have successfully separated the local reasonableness of their individual actions from the aggregate meaning of what those actions produce.
The UWV physician who dismisses the Long Covid file is not a fascist. The pro-deo lawyer who declines the appeal is not a monster. The administrative court judge who defers to the agency’s medical expert is not corrupt in any simple sense. They are, each of them, doing something pariochially defensible.
And together they are producing something that is not defensible at all: the systematic abandonment of people whose suffering is real, whose diagnoses are documented, and whose exclusion serves the financial convenience of an institution that has decided it cannot afford the truth.
The banality is the point. The banality is the mechanism. Systems that need to produce unjust outcomes at scale require that the people producing them feel, at each individual step, that they are doing something reasonable.
The Civilizational Argument
There is a version of this argument that is purely pragmatic: denial is more expensive than recognition, costs are deferred not eliminated, the accounting is dishonest. That argument is true and it is important.
But it is not the deepest argument. The deepest argument is civilizational.
A society that lies about what it sees — that manufactures official uncertainty to avoid the cost of official truth — is a society that has abandoned the epistemic commons. The shared reality. The agreement that what exists, exists, and that we respond to it together.
Once that agreement is broken, it does not break cleanly. It frays. And the fraying propagates through every institution that relied on it. Courts that have learned to defer to convenient expertise. Lawyers who have learned which cases to avoid. Physicians who have learned which assessments produce acceptable outcomes. Families who have learned that persistence is punished and that the system’s contempt is not an aberration but a policy instrument.
And then the next rounding error arrives.
Maybe it is a different disease. Maybe it is a different demographic. Maybe it is defined by how people pray, or where their parents were born, or what they wear, or what they voted for, or simply whether they are sufficiently expensive to help.
The criteria shift. The mechanism stays.
What We Owe Each Other
A functional society does not promise to be cheap. It promises to be honest.
It says: when the unlucky arrive at our door — the sick, the disabled, the people whose bodies have been damaged by a virus we did not prevent, whose lives have been interrupted by circumstances we did not anticipate — we will look at them clearly. We will not manufacture ambiguity because clarity is expensive. We will not calibrate our thresholds to the budget rather than to the reality of their suffering. We will have the collective conversation, openly and on the record, about what we can afford and what we choose to prioritize — rather than hiding that conversation behind the false neutrality of assessment procedures.
That is what we owe each other.
Not the guarantee of infinite resources. Not the promise that every claim will be met in full.
Just the commitment to honesty. To shared reality. To the recognition that the person in front of us exists, and suffers, and that their existence and their suffering are not negotiable facts that can be adjusted to fit the fiscal year.
When a state abandons that commitment — even once, even for understandable reasons, even wrapped in the legitimate language of evidentiary standards and procedural caution — it has taken a step that is very easy to take again.
And again.
The young man who cannot stand is not just a case file.
He is a test.
Of whether we still mean what we said we meant.